艾未未工作室 @艾未未
陈有西律师团队
安元鼎保安团队
合同的基本对价是：
1，甲方为乙方提供在中国境内受法律平等保护的最大可能机会。在乙方愿意通过司法途径解决问题的前提下，甲方在第一时间为乙方出具意见，提供人身保护，保全司法程序证据，最大程度上预防并避免乙方的对手妨碍司法公正。
2，乙方按照甲方通过精算师估算出来的费率缴纳每年的法律保险费。
本保险条款旨在保障当事人在正式聘请律师之前所承担的风险，乙方正式聘请律师的费用不在本保险条款。
Monday, December 27, 2010
Tuesday, November 16, 2010
性浪微勃这次能勃起多久？
@罗昌平：「请张仁良区长现身说明」 多方消息称，造成上海高楼失火的上海佳艺装饰有限公司的法人代表黄佩信，就是静安区区长张仁良的夫人。以3000万的所谓节能改造项目，且未经过任何招投标手续得到这个项目，然后马上转包给下线公司，经过再一次分包给了小施工队，最终到了几个临时工头上
Wednesday, November 3, 2010
注定将成为史上最失败的公关案例
各位同事，大家好！
大家应该都已经看到了公司今天下午6点在官网上发出的《腾讯公司致用户的一封信》（全文见附件）。 秉承腾讯"一切以用户价值为依归"的经营理念，经过慎重的研究，公司决定在所有安装了360软件的电脑上停止运行QQ软件。也许短期来看公司将蒙受一些用户数下降的影响，但这个举措将最大限度的保障QQ用户的安全，免于遭受恶意软件的危害。我们相信，这个决定必将利于QQ和腾讯的长期稳健发展。
这段时间以来，每个腾讯人都一直在高度关注360事件的发展。为了保障用户的合法权益不受恶意侵害，即通、研究院、公关部等部门的同事们夜以继日的加班加点，很多其它部门的热心同事通过不同的途径为公司提供信息，出谋划策，更多的同事则主动充当客服人员，向身边有疑惑的亲朋好友进行解释和说明。在此我们向大家表示感谢，你们都用自己亲身的行动维护了腾讯最为珍视的"用户价值"！
这场战斗还将持续，但因为腾讯是真正把用户价值放在第一位的，因此我们坚信必将赢得用户的支持，打赢这场战斗。希望全体腾讯人保持并发扬主人翁精神，通过你们的专业知识和对行业的了解，主动向你们身边的亲朋好友说明事实真相，帮助更多的QQ用户早日辨明真伪，做出正确的选择。同时，也再次号召全体腾讯人，把"一切以用户价值为依归"的经营理念切实落实到包括QQ在内的腾讯所有产品和服务上，只有创造并维护了用户价值，才能赢得用户的认可和尊重。
Tuesday, October 19, 2010
假设这个文件是真的
作为消费者我一直保持对伊利蒙牛这些大公司应有的警惕，从来不买他们的任何产品，世博会被迫吃了几口他们的冰激淋，目前尚有心理阴影。
假设这个文件是真的，则我对他们的警惕又高了一级，干掉蒙牛以后他们将独霸江湖，作恶起来可以为所欲为。
从头到尾没有一句是关心消费者利益的，从文章的叙述来看，红衣主教们在解决商业竞争的事情上，似乎并没有采取公平公正的立场，给读者感觉从一开始就已经将蒙牛进行有罪推定，也没有过问这些产品的质量到底有没有问题。此外，我也比较关心蒙牛作为犯罪嫌疑人的权利，有没有得到司法的公平对待，甚至是有没有得到司法的对待？通篇未提法院一词，不知道公安部的孟部长花了那么多精力侦破此案，会不会进行公开的审理，还是免得劳烦法院，通过行政手段解决掉算了。我猜不会有。
但是蒙牛不是说已经被中粮收购了吗？既然大家都是国资委的子孙了，为什么要同室操戈呢？从文章罗列的那么多关怀伊利的党政领导，让人不由很想知道，蒙牛现在还有没有自己的亲娘，或者只是一个和外国姨太太的私生子，只能认命了？
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疑似伊利内部流传的关于蒙牛恶意策划“性早熟事件”的文件
http://bbs.66wz.com/thread-778262-1-1.html
蒙牛集团蓄意破坏我公司(伊利)的商业信誉、商品声誉案件侦破进展
前言：
潮起潮又落。乳业大发展的十多年间，除了光鲜亮丽的数字，还有不为人知的艰苦。展现在我们面前的，从来没有一马平川的道路，从来没有简单的经营环境。无论前面是悬崖峭壁，还是暗礁险流，我们依旧会奔腾向前、掌握未来。因为，我们有勇气、有智慧去面对任何艰难险阻，排除万难，去赢得胜利。
前期，乳业发生了“圣元奶粉性早熟事件”，导致圣元奶粉市场销售停滞，圣元品牌形象一落千丈，消费者纷纷退货，圣元乳业遭受巨大损失。虽然国家卫生部后来提供了圣元奶粉不含性激素的报告，证明圣元奶粉和婴儿性早熟无关，但是消费者依然不相信，仍在质疑圣元奶粉。
大家也许不知道，“圣元奶粉性早熟事件”事实上是我们的主要竞争对手——蒙牛乳业有组织、有预谋、有计划、有步骤周密策划出来的，而且这是专门针对我们的QQ星儿童奶、婴儿奶粉策划的一起蓄意破坏活动。由于我们反应快速、判断准确、措施果断最终幸免于难，而圣元则深陷“性早熟门”。
近期，在各级政府领导的关心和大力支持下，在内蒙古公安机关的不懈努力下，案件调查终于有了突破性进展，情况也越来越清晰，幕后主使蒙牛集团（蒙牛乳业在开曼群岛注册，80%为外资）也浮出了水面。
经查，蒙牛集团总裁助理杨再飞、蒙牛集团安勇等人及北京博斯智奇公关顾问有限公司、北京戴斯普瑞网络营销顾问有限公司等数人涉案。其中，蒙牛集团总裁助理杨再飞（兼北京博斯智奇公关顾问有限公司总经理）已被边境控制；蒙牛集团儿童奶项目负责人安勇被刑事拘留(安勇曾在9月23日出逃美国，签证到期后于10月3日从美国返回北京，刚下飞机即被刑事拘留)，现已由刑事拘留转为正式批捕；蒙牛集团儿童奶项目成员刘慧芳接受调查；北京博斯智奇公关顾问有限公司副总经理赵士勇（该人曾任蒙牛集团首席顾问）、副总经理兼项目部负责人肖雪梅等7人接受审讯、网络部负责人赵宁、马野、郝历平等3人被拘留，赵宁、郝历平现已由拘留转为正式批捕。目前，还有北京戴斯普瑞网络营销顾问有限公司两人在逃，公安部已经发布B级通缉令在全国通缉。
根据公安部门调查发现的情况，现把整个案件整理还原，让大家了解。
今年7月，部分网络和平面媒体刊发的《深海鱼油大多有问题，专家称造假现象严重》、《深海鱼油市场鱼龙混杂，所含EPA成分存巨大隐忧》、《专家：“深海鱼油”危害超过地沟油》等文章，在各大论坛中，攻击伊利的《出奇的愤怒！残害儿童！伊利QQ星有深海鱼油》、《伊利QQ星，希望你能有勇气站出来承认错误》、《抵制伊利集结号：用我们的行动救救孩子》等帖文大面积出现，并有大量恶意转载。仅开心网的相关帖子的点击率就达到每日30多万次。
集团公共事务部和液态奶事业部第一时间通过危机监测系统发现事态后，及时向潘总做了汇报，潘总马上判断出这是一起针对我们的有组织、有预谋的恶意攻击事件，立即部署启动应急公关程序。
事发第二天，潘总就找到一位国家主要领导，要求在媒体上进行控制，以免事态进一步扩大。同时，潘总也及时向中共内蒙古自治区党委副书记、内蒙古自治区主席巴特尔，内蒙古自治区副主席、内蒙古公安厅厅长赵黎平，内蒙古自治区党委常委、呼和浩特市委书记韩志然等领导做了汇报，并且安排向内蒙古的公安机关报案。
内蒙古自治区及呼市主要领导非常重视这个案件，自治区党委书记胡春华，自治区党委副书记、自治区主席巴特尔，自治区党委副书记、常务副主席任亚平，自治区党委常委、政法委书记邢云，自治区党委常委、宣传部长乌兰，自治区党委常委、呼市市委书记韩志然，自治区副主席、内蒙古公安厅厅长赵黎平等多位领导先后多次做出重要批示并对相关工作进行了周密部署，指示自治区公安厅、市公安局、开发区分局抽调精兵强将，成立专案组开展调查取证，对破案工作要抓紧落实，对案子要一查到底。
在案件侦破过程中，几位领导还多次听取公安机关的案情进展汇报，指示一定要早日破案。
期间，中共中央政治局常委**同志做了重要批示，要求尽快破案，孟建柱同志也做了重要批示，公安部指示内蒙古公安厅迅速破案。
整个专案组中秋节、国庆节都没有休息，经过深入调查，案件取得重大进展，提取到蒙牛内部打击伊利的策划方案。根据这个策划方案，蒙牛的攻击路径分以下几个步骤执行：
第一步，操纵利用非主流媒体，攻击深海鱼油产品，引发社会公众对深海鱼油产品的关注，进而产生恐慌。2010年7月13日，《生命时报》刊登了《深海鱼油大多有问题专家称造假现象严重》的报道，随后网上出现了23篇转载。随后7月14、15日，《京华时报》、《北京娱乐信报》、《东方早报》三家媒体跟进，发表题为《深海鱼油市场鱼龙混杂，所含EPA成分存巨大隐忧》的文章，指“鱼油中EPA成分对婴幼儿健康不利，实验室提取的纯植物藻油DHA是保健首选”。文章皆无署名，是典型的广告软文推送。同时，新浪、网易、搜狐、腾讯、人民网、新华网等近二十余家主流网络进行转载。文中未提及企业名称。集团公共事务部在第一时间内与这些媒体进行了沟通，媒体告知文章是由公关代理公司以广告形式投放的，并且原计划后续还有几篇跟进的文章打算在纸媒上投放。我公司随即采取了“抓源头”的正确公关策略，和发布这些文章的代理公司取得联系并晓以利害，成功将后续稿件全部撤单。过程中，公共事务部了解到其中有两家公司与蒙牛公关公司均有业务往来。
第二步，他们通过网络推手，开始了以网络为主阵地的深度攻击，引出深海鱼油中的EPA导致儿童性早熟，点名攻击使用深海鱼油产品的企业，开始引出儿童性早熟问题，将矛头直指伊利、金龙鱼、圣元、安利等企业。7月19日、20日，在千龙网、雅虎网、中华网、中国经济网、中国财经网、猫扑网等门户网站上出现了题为《专家：“深海鱼油”危害超过地沟油》的转载文章，文中称“深海鱼油”DHA含有EPA，会导致儿童性早熟；文中直接点名，“目前国内主打深海鱼油的品牌有伊利QQ星儿童奶、圣元奶粉、金龙鱼、安利深海鱼油等
在7月17日左右，“深海鱼油门”事件开始后不久，他们向湖北某媒体记者爆料“武汉有女婴因食用圣元优博品牌奶粉导致性早熟”；8月5日，《健康时报》首家刊发题为《武汉三女婴食用某品牌奶粉后出现性早熟乳房开始发育》的文章；8月6日，《凤凰卫视》、《凤凰网》发布题为《女婴疑因食用奶粉出现性早熟圣元回应称产品绝对没问题》的文章，同时其它媒体也跟进报道，引发公众及媒体广泛关注；8月8日，各大媒体纷纷追踪“圣元身陷激素门”，消费者高度关注。
第三步，他们通过网络推手集中打击伊利QQ星儿童奶，企图将伊利QQ星儿童奶也拖入“性早熟门”，从而影响伊利QQ 星正常销售，以使蒙牛儿童奶受益。一些由互联网发起的攻击直指伊利QQ星产品使用深海鱼油（深海鱼油的安全性早已得到卫生部的认可，并被批准为新资源食品，根本不存在所谓致性早熟问题。以安全标准要求最高的婴幼儿食品为例，鱼油来源的DHA占总使用率的75%，包括联合利华、雀巢、美赞臣等国内外知名企业均有广泛使用），并恶意渲染深海鱼油中所含EPA成分也会导致儿童“性早熟”，文章还被一些非主流媒体转载，大有穷追猛打之势。
7月27日之后，新浪网、天涯社区、开心网、猫扑网等网络论坛大面积出现题为《出奇的愤怒！残害儿童！伊利QQ星有深海鱼油》、《伊利QQ星，希望你能有勇气站出来承认错误》、《抵制伊利集结号：用我们的行动救救孩子》等帖文，并有大量恶意转载，仅开心网相关帖子的点击率就达到每日30多万。这一次攻击的目标直指伊利产品。事件愈演愈烈，很多不明真相的消费者开始质疑添加深海鱼油的相关产品，纷纷向客服致电询问鱼油问题，集团公司承受着巨大压力。
据后来发现的蒙牛内部策划方案显示，蒙牛接下来还会使用手机报、手机短信等手段进一步发布相关攻击信息，幸亏我公司及时启动应急机制，在各级领导的大力支持下，蒙牛这一波的媒体打击得以顺利化解。
经专案组查明，最早刊发在新浪网和天涯社区的帖文，是在北京人李友平的电脑上传的。李还曾将“伊利深海鱼油1300多条发稿情况”汇总发送给29岁的宁夏人张明。李、张二人正是在北京市石景山区注册的戴斯普瑞网络营销顾问有限公司的总经理和监事,而这家公司的网站上赫然写着蒙牛乳业是它的大客户。
随着侦查工作的进一步推进，张明与北京博斯智奇公关顾问有限公司之间关于借助炒作深海鱼油，进而实施有组织、有计划打击伊利的策划方案也随着他们之间的往来邮件而浮出水面。据专案组分析，这是一起损害伊利集团商业信誉和商品声誉（刑法第221条）的有组织、有计划、有预谋的严重犯罪行为。除了指使张明、李友平利用新浪网和天涯社区发帖对伊利集团产品进行攻击外，博斯智奇公关顾问有限公司还以同样的手法借助网络推手，利用广州的大洋网、天津的聚友网等多家网站和部分媒体刊发类似帖文，对伊利集团产品进行负面炒作。从网络公开资料显示，博斯智奇公关顾问有限公司是为蒙牛乳业贴身服务了10多年的公关公司，而其公司总经理就是蒙牛乳业总裁助理杨再飞。
正当警方在9月3日中午前刚锁定博斯智奇公司并准备对张明、李友平等人进行抓捕时，消息疑被透露出去，涉案人员于9月3日下午5、6点左右全部潜逃。
法网恢恢，疏而不漏。尽管张明、李友平仍在通缉中，但是博斯智奇公关公司网络部负责人赵宁、马野、郝历平、蒙牛集团儿童奶项目负责人安勇等人已经分别被拘留，博斯智奇公关公司的副总经理赵士勇、副总经理兼项目部负责人肖雪梅等7人、蒙牛集团儿童奶副总监赵宇宁、职员刘慧芳接受审讯。
专案组根据已查明证据，判断这是蒙牛集团为了达到打击伊利儿童奶产品、婴幼儿奶粉产品，使得蒙牛相关产品能够赢得更多市场份额的目的，对我公司进行的系列策划、执行恶意攻击的一起恶性事件。
这是蒙牛集团典型的一起通过炒作伊利的虚假负面信息，制造伊利的媒体负面新闻，进而引发消费者和公众对伊利的质疑和不信任，最终实现破坏伊利集团商业信誉、品牌形象，破坏伊利良好的经营势头，让自己得利的卑鄙行径。
回溯事态的发展过程，这是一起在各级政府领导的关心和支持下，正义战胜邪恶的典型胜利，这对净化商业环境、稳定社会秩序有着极其重要而深远的意义。
蒙牛集团的恶意攻击行为已经超越了商业竞争的底线，已经触犯了法律！事件造成了乳品消费的极大恐慌，也造成了民众对国产乳制品的信任危机，引发新一轮的中国乳业危机。
这次恶意攻击不仅使我公司承受了巨大压力，也造成了民众对相关政府监管机构的不满，甚至影响了民众对政府的信任度。
事实上，这并不是蒙牛集团对我公司进行的第一次恶意攻击，办案人员在涉案人员电脑中还发现了多份已经执行过的攻击伊利的策划案。例如，今年，蒙牛集团到处在伊利集团的奶源基地抢奶，其中，河北省张家口市张北县、辽宁省沈阳市阜新县两地政府坚决抵制蒙牛破坏奶源基地建设的抢奶行为。蒙牛集团抢不到奶就编造“阜新县有人被伊利潜规则了派警力帮伊利收奶”、“商场现形记之乳业篇——伊利勾结黑帮欺压奶农”等材料发往各个媒体，并煽动媒体进行报道，有部分不明真相的媒体进行了失实报道，结果导致舆论质疑地方政府干预市场经济、质疑地方政府的执政能力，使得为维护奶农长期利益、为当地奶源健康稳定发展的政府官员面临极大的压力，也使得很多地方政府在面对抢奶源问题时畏手畏脚，导致蒙牛抢奶肆无忌惮，造成奶源基地管理混乱。
事实上，除了类似的恶意商业诽谤外，蒙牛还多次采用不道德手段进行不正当竞争。例如，今年在对我国探月工程的赞助活动中，我公司经过招标最早与国防科工局签订了“中国探月工程的唯一指定乳制品”协议。此后，招标落选的蒙牛乳业又利用非常规手段找到国防科工局的其他部门，通过搞定个别人并利用国防科工局的管理漏洞，以不正当手段与国防科工局也签署了“中国探月工程的唯一指定乳制品”协议。面对国防科工局“一女二嫁”和蒙牛的不正当竞争，面对蒙牛高调提前宣传的情况，我公司本着国家利益高于一切的原则没有采取过激行为，而是通过积极谈判和国防科工局寻求解决方案。
事实上，中国乳业的发展道路从来就不平坦，我国乳品企业长期存在恶性竞争，各种危机四伏。因此，潘总带领公司经营班子，在日常生产经营过程中一直承受着非常巨大的压力，潘总的手机一直都保持全天24小时开机，危机意识永远放在第一位，一遇到问题便不分白天黑夜第一时间进行处理。
面对这样的经营压力，面对竞争对手的蓄意破坏，集团公司能取得今天的成绩实属不易。我们是一支不怕困难的队伍，竞争对手越是想破坏我们的正常经营，越是害怕我们发展，我们就越要努力做好自己的工作，越要争取最优秀的经营业绩。
祝愿我们的伊利在前进的道路上走得更远，走得更好！
Thursday, October 14, 2010
你知道重庆为什么打击黑恶势力不？你知道什么叫恶不？跟政府作对就是恶。
重庆市江津区人民政府新闻办公室关于《财新网》刊发失实报道的声明
2010-10-12
http://cq.cqnews.net/sz/zwyw/201010/t20101012_4652028.htm关于重庆市江津区政府回应本网报道的声明
2010-10-13
“风水书记”为何敢于公开回应“风水门”录音事件？
2010年10月14日 16:54:44 华龙网
亮点：王银峰到底有没有说过这句话，只要开发商公开录音，公众一经对照辨认即可明了。王银峰敢于直接回应，并公开表示欢迎开发商到网络上公布录音，由此可见王银峰底气十足，并不迷信权力。
亮点：不管这一事件最后如何解决，他的警示意义在于提醒广大普通民众，当认为自身合法利益受到侵犯后，一定要做好对话录音等证据保全工作，维权曝光以证据说话
（我是法盲，有谁能告诉我，中国法庭支不支持，程序违法的证据？）
�家：重�江津�委��“�水�”�音曝光
2010年10月14日 14:03 �凰��� 比华龙网早3个小时 有点意思
你知道重庆为什么打击黑恶势力不？你知道什么叫恶不？跟政府作对就是恶。
什么叫拖主子下水？ 如此诠释薄主教用心，李庄你太恶！
建议大家继续关注
Friday, July 23, 2010
Thursday, July 22, 2010
Monday, February 22, 2010
动物小品：黑律师
动物小品：黑律师—巴哥系列
人物：巴哥，猫，猎肠，德牧
清晨，巴哥在自家大门上叮叮咚咚的安装一块木头招牌。从他的敲击节奏，能听得出来他非常兴奋。
猫就住在巴哥家对面的树上，她被这兴奋的节奏一下子从睡梦中唤醒了，一纵身跳下来，抬头一念“黑~律~师~事~务~所~”猫跳下来悄无声息，巴哥被吓了一大跳，卷起的尾巴一下子拉直了，低头转过身，一张不威自怒的脸让人不由联想到了Gordon Brown。
猫已经习惯了巴哥这种条件反射，只是把头微微往后退了退，拉着长长的鼻音说“黑律师事务所？等等，等等，巴哥，什么叫黑律师事务所？”
巴哥放松了进攻表情，抬头，挺胸，缓缓地卷起尾巴说道“我骄傲！我是一个黑律师！”
猫愣了半晌，说：“你是律师？我怎么从来都不知道？还我骄傲~~~，黑律师比白律师厉害吗？是不是就像跆拳道黑带那样的……”
巴哥一脸无奈的打断了猫：“唯女子与猫难养也，还是一只雌猫！”
“巴哥！我警告你！不要再发表这种种族主义与性别歧视言论！当心我告你！”
巴哥笑着用手指了指刚钉上去的照牌，但是他这张脸，谁看得出来他是在笑。
猫的“警告你！”把最爱看热闹的猎肠和德牧给招来了。猎肠打量了半天，没看出任何战斗的迹象，最后终于看到巴哥身旁的招牌了。
他模仿周星驰的哈哈哈……又派上用场了。
“巴哥，你连律师都不是，你怎么能开事务所呢？而且黑律师已经臭大街了，你还不知道？”
巴哥很同情的看着高兴得满地打滚的猎肠说道：“可怜的孩子！你卖报纸可以，怎么可以看报纸呢？”
德牧举手表示同意：“我挺黑律师！黑律师可以当赌城市长，黑律师还能当美国总统！但是巴哥我有点晕，我看着你从小长大，你确实不是一个律师啊。”
“我这叫做要黑黑到底！正因为我不是律师所以我才是黑律师；我比白律师更懂什么叫法律；另外嘛，我长着包公脸，是天生的黑！”
猎肠不同意了：“拜托巴哥！我比你更黑！我浑身上下都是黑的！要是放到湖南的话，连阿德都比你“灰”，灰~~~律师，呵呵。脸长得象包公只能叫黑法官！”
“抱歉，现在还没有令人尊敬的黑法官。”巴哥说道，“目前看来黑衣法官只能让象你这样读报纸的白痴来当。”
“好啊好啊，法官可以管律师，我可以管你咯，我可以管你咯~~~”
猫一下子明白了，“原来真的象跆拳道一样，黑才是最高境界，那黑社会是不是比共产主义还要好？应该是吧。怪不得他们管警察叫黑猫……”想到这里她大叫一声“全都给我不许动！我宣布我是黑猫！你们都归我管！”
要黑黑到底！把此文献给我所信仰的东西。
Sunday, February 21, 2010
OCTOBER TERM, 2009
Test translation via route:
google docs--blogger--google translate toolkit
OCTOBER TERM, 2009
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as isbeing done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has beenprepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
CITIZENS UNITED v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
No. 08–205. Argued March 24, 2009—Reargued September 9, 2009––Decided January 21, 2010
As amended by §203 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002(BCRA), federal law prohibits corporations and unions from usingtheir general treasury funds to make independent expenditures for speech that is an “electioneering communication” or for speech thatexpressly advocates the election or defeat of a candidate. 2 U. S. C. §441b. An electioneering communication is “any broadcast, cable, orsatellite communication” that “refers to a clearly identified candidatefor Federal office” and is made within 30 days of a primary election,§434(f)(3)(A), and that is “publicly distributed,” 11 CFR §100.29(a)(2),which in “the case of a candidate for nomination for President . . . means” that the communication “[c]an be received by 50,000 or morepersons in a State where a primary election . . . is being held within 30 days,” §100.29(b)(3)(ii). Corporations and unions may establish apolitical action committee (PAC) for express advocacy or electioneer-ing communications purposes. 2 U. S. C. §441b(b)(2). In McConnell v.Federal Election Comm’n, 540 U. S. 93, 203–209, this Court upheld limits on electioneering communications in a facial challenge, relyingon the holding in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, that political speech may be banned based on the speaker’s corporate identity.
In January 2008, appellant Citizens United, a nonprofit corpora-tion, released a documentary (hereinafter Hillary) critical of then-Senator Hillary Clinton, a candidate for her party’s Presidential nomination. Anticipating that it would make Hillary available on cable television through video-on-demand within 30 days of primaryelections, Citizens United produced television ads to run on broadcast and cable television. Concerned about possible civil and criminal penalties for violating §441b, it sought declaratory and injunctive re-lief, arguing that (1) §441b is unconstitutional as applied to Hillary;and (2) BCRA’s disclaimer, disclosure, and reporting requirements,BCRA §§201 and 311, were unconstitutional as applied to Hillaryand the ads. The District Court denied Citizens United a prelimi-nary injunction and granted appellee Federal Election Commission(FEC) summary judgment.
Held:
1. Because the question whether §441b applies to Hillary cannot be resolved on other, narrower grounds without chilling political speech, this Court must consider the continuing effect of the speech suppres-sion upheld in Austin. Pp. 5–20.
(a)
Citizen United’s narrower arguments—that Hillary is not an “electioneering communication” covered by §441b because it is not“publicly distributed” under 11 CFR §100.29(a)(2); that §441b maynot be applied to Hillary under Federal Election Comm’n v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U. S. 449 (WRTL), which found §441b uncon-stitutional as applied to speech that was not “express advocacy or its functional equivalent,” id., at 481 (opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.), deter-mining that a communication “is the functional equivalent of express advocacy only if [it] is susceptible of no reasonable interpretationother than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate,” id., at 469–470; that §441b should be invalidated as applied to movies shown through video-on-demand because this delivery system has alower risk of distorting the political process than do television ads;and that there should be an exception to §441b’s ban for nonprofitcorporate political speech funded overwhelming by individuals—arenot sustainable under a fair reading of the statute. Pp. 5–12.
(b)
Thus, this case cannot be resolved on a narrower ground without chilling political speech, speech that is central to the First Amendment’s meaning and purpose. Citizens United did not waive this challenge to Austin when it stipulated to dismissing the facial challenge below, since (1) even if such a challenge could be waived, this Court may reconsider Austin and §441b’s facial validity here be-cause the District Court “passed upon” the issue, Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation, 513 U. S. 374, 379; (2) throughoutthe litigation, Citizens United has asserted a claim that the FEC hasviolated its right to free speech; and (3) the parties cannot enter intoa stipulation that prevents the Court from considering remedies nec-essary to resolve a claim that has been preserved. Because Citizen United’s narrower arguments are not sustainable, this Court must, in an exercise of its judicial responsibility, consider §441b’s facial valid-ity. Any other course would prolong the substantial, nationwide chilling effect caused by §441b’s corporate expenditure ban. This conclusion is further supported by the following: (1) the uncertaintycaused by the Government’s litigating position; (2) substantial timewould be required to clarify §441b’s application on the points raisedby the Government’s position in order to avoid any chilling effect caused by an improper interpretation; and (3) because speech itself is of primary importance to the integrity of the election process, anyspeech arguably within the reach of rules created for regulating po-litical speech is chilled. The regulatory scheme at issue may not be aprior restraint in the strict sense. However, given its complexity and the deference courts show to administrative determinations, a speaker wishing to avoid criminal liability threats and the heavycosts of defending against FEC enforcement must ask a governmen-tal agency for prior permission to speak. The restrictions thus func-tion as the equivalent of a prior restraint, giving the FEC poweranalogous to the type of government practices that the First Amend-ment was drawn to prohibit. The ongoing chill on speech makes itnecessary to invoke the earlier precedents that a statute that chills speech can and must be invalidated where its facial invalidity hasbeen demonstrated. Pp. 12–20.
2. Austin is overruled, and thus provides no basis for allowing the Government to limit corporate independent expenditures. Hence, §441b’s restrictions on such expenditures are invalid and cannot be applied to Hillary. Given this conclusion, the part of McConnell that upheld BCRA §203’s extension of §441b’s restrictions on independent corporate expenditures is also overruled. Pp. 20–51.
(a) Although the First Amendment provides that “Congress shallmake no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech,” §441b’s prohibitionon corporate independent expenditures is an outright ban on speech, backed by criminal sanctions. It is a ban notwithstanding the factthat a PAC created by a corporation can still speak, for a PAC is aseparate association from the corporation. Because speech is an es-sential mechanism of democracy—it is the means to hold officials ac-countable to the people—political speech must prevail against lawsthat would suppress it by design or inadvertence. Laws burdening such speech are subject to strict scrutiny, which requires the Gov-ernment to prove that the restriction “furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.” WRTL, 551 U. S., at 464. This language provides a sufficient framework for protecting the interests in this case. Premised on mistrust of governmentalpower, the First Amendment stands against attempts to disfavor cer-tain subjects or viewpoints or to distinguish among different speak-ers, which may be a means to control content. The Government may also commit a constitutional wrong when by law it identifies certain preferred speakers. There is no basis for the proposition that, in thepolitical speech context, the Government may impose restrictions oncertain disfavored speakers. Both history and logic lead to this con-clusion. Pp. 20–25.
(b)
The Court has recognized that the First Amendment appliesto corporations, e.g., First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765, 778, n. 14, and extended this protection to the context of politicalspeech, see, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 428–429. Address-ing challenges to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, the Buckley Court upheld limits on direct contributions to candidates, 18
U.
S. C. §608(b), recognizing a governmental interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption. 424 U. S., at 25–26. However, the Court in-validated §608(e)’s expenditure ban, which applied to individuals,corporations, and unions, because it “fail[ed] to serve any substantialgovernmental interest in stemming the reality or appearance of cor-ruption in the electoral process,” id., at 47–48. While Buckley did not consider a separate ban on corporate and union independent expendi-tures found in §610, had that provision been challenged in Buckley’s wake, it could not have been squared with the precedent’s reasoning and analysis. The Buckley Court did not invoke the overbreadth doc-trine to suggest that §608(e)’s expenditure ban would have been con-stitutional had it applied to corporations and unions but not indi-viduals. Notwithstanding this precedent, Congress soon recodified §610’s corporate and union expenditure ban at 2 U. S. C. §441b, the provision at issue. Less than two years after Buckley, Bellotti reaf-firmed the First Amendment principle that the Government lacks thepower to restrict political speech based on the speaker’s corporate identity. 435 U.S., at 784–785. Thus the law stood until Austin up-held a corporate independent expenditure restriction, bypassing Buckley and Bellotti by recognizing a new governmental interest inpreventing “the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggrega-tions of [corporate] wealth . . . that have little or no correlation to thepublic’s support for the corporation’s political ideas.” 494 U. S., at
660. Pp. 25–32.
(c)
This Court is confronted with conflicting lines of precedent: a pre-Austin line forbidding speech restrictions based on the speaker’s corporate identity and a post-Austin line permitting them. Neither Austin’s antidistortion rationale nor the Government’s other justifica-tions support §441b’s restrictions. Pp. 32–47.
(1)
The First Amendment prohibits Congress from fining or jailing citizens, or associations of citizens, for engaging in politicalspeech, but Austin’s antidistortion rationale would permit the Gov-ernment to ban political speech because the speaker is an associationwith a corporate form. Political speech is “indispensable to decision-making in a democracy, and this is no less true because the speechcomes from a corporation.” Bellotti, supra, at 777 (footnote omitted). This protection is inconsistent with Austin’s rationale, which is meant to prevent corporations from obtaining “ ‘an unfair advantage in the political marketplace’ ” by using “ ‘resources amassed in the economic marketplace.’ ” 494 U. S., at 659. First Amendment protec-tions do not depend on the speaker’s “financial ability to engage in public discussion.” Buckley, supra, at 49. These conclusions were re-affirmed when the Court invalidated a BCRA provision that in-creased the cap on contributions to one candidate if the opponent made certain expenditures from personal funds. Davis v. Federal Election Comm’n, 554 U. S. ___, ___. Distinguishing wealthy indi-viduals from corporations based on the latter’s special advantages of, e.g., limited liability, does not suffice to allow laws prohibiting speech. It is irrelevant for First Amendment purposes that corporate funds may “have little or no correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s political ideas.” Austin, supra, at 660. All speakers, in-cluding individuals and the media, use money amassed from the eco-nomic marketplace to fund their speech, and the First Amendment protects the resulting speech. Under the antidistortion rationale, Congress could also ban political speech of media corporations. Al-though currently exempt from §441b, they accumulate wealth withthe help of their corporate form, may have aggregations of wealth,and may express views “hav[ing] little or no correlation to the public’ssupport” for those views. Differential treatment of media corpora-tions and other corporations cannot be squared with the First Amendment, and there is no support for the view that the Amend-ment’s original meaning would permit suppressing media corpora-tions’ political speech. Austin interferes with the “open marketplace”of ideas protected by the First Amendment. New York State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 552 U. S. 196, 208. Its censorship is vast inits reach, suppressing the speech of both for-profit and nonprofit,both small and large, corporations. Pp. 32–40.
(2) This reasoning also shows the invalidity of the Govern-ment’s other arguments. It reasons that corporate political speechcan be banned to prevent corruption or its appearance. The BuckleyCourt found this rationale “sufficiently important” to allow contribu-tion limits but refused to extend that reasoning to expenditure limits,424 U.S., at 25, and the Court does not do so here. While a single Bellotti footnote purported to leave the question open, 435 U. S., at788, n. 26, this Court now concludes that independent expenditures, including those made by corporations, do not give rise to corruptionor the appearance of corruption. That speakers may have influence over or access to elected officials does not mean that those officials are corrupt. And the appearance of influence or access will not causethe electorate to lose faith in this democracy. Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U. S. ___, distinguished. Pp. 40–45.
(3)
The Government’s asserted interest in protecting share-holders from being compelled to fund corporate speech, like the anti-distortion rationale, would allow the Government to ban politicalspeech even of media corporations. The statute is underinclusive; it only protects a dissenting shareholder’s interests in certain media for 30 or 60 days before an election when such interests would be impli-cated in any media at any time. It is also overinclusive because it covers all corporations, including those with one shareholder. P. 46.
(4)
Because §441b is not limited to corporations or associa-tions created in foreign countries or funded predominantly by foreignshareholders, it would be overbroad even if the Court were to recog-nize a compelling governmental interest in limiting foreign influence over the Nation’s political process. Pp. 46–47.
(d)
The relevant factors in deciding whether to adhere to stare decisis, beyond workability—the precedent’s antiquity, the reliance interests at stake, and whether the decision was well reasoned— counsel in favor of abandoning Austin, which itself contravened the precedents of Buckley and Bellotti. As already explained, Austin was not well reasoned. It is also undermined by experience since its an-nouncement. Political speech is so ingrained in this country’s culture that speakers find ways around campaign finance laws. Rapid changes in technology—and the creative dynamic inherent in the concept of free expression—counsel against upholding a law that re-stricts political speech in certain media or by certain speakers. In addition, no serious reliance issues are at stake. Thus, due consid-eration leads to the conclusion that Austin should be overruled. The Court returns to the principle established in Buckley and Bellotti that the Government may not suppress political speech based on the speaker’s corporate identity. No sufficient governmental interest jus-tifies limits on the political speech of nonprofit or for-profit corpora-tions. Pp. 47–50.
3. BCRA §§201 and 311 are valid as applied to the ads for Hillaryand to the movie itself. Pp. 50–57.
(a) Disclaimer and disclosure requirements may burden the abil-ity to speak, but they “impose no ceiling on campaign-related activi-ties,” Buckley, 424 U. S., at 64, or “ ‘ “prevent anyone from speak-ing,” ’ ” McConnell, supra, at 201. The Buckley Court explained that disclosure can be justified by a governmental interest in providing “the electorate with information” about election-related spending sources. The McConnell Court applied this interest in rejecting facialchallenges to §§201 and 311. 540 U. S., at 196. However, the Court acknowledged that as-applied challenges would be available if agroup could show a “ ‘reasonable probability’ ” that disclosing its con-tributors’ names would “ ‘subject them to threats, harassment, or re-prisals from either Government officials or private parties.’ ” Id., at
198. Pp. 50–52.
(b) The disclaimer and disclosure requirements are valid as ap-plied to Citizens United’s ads. They fall within BCRA’s “electioneer-ing communication” definition: They referred to then-Senator Clintonby name shortly before a primary and contained pejorative references to her candidacy. Section 311 disclaimers provide information to the electorate, McConnell, supra, at 196, and “insure that the voters are fully informed” about who is speaking, Buckley, supra, at 76. At the very least, they avoid confusion by making clear that the ads are not funded by a candidate or political party. Citizens United’s arguments that §311 is underinclusive because it requires disclaimers for broad-cast advertisements but not for print or Internet advertising and that §311 decreases the quantity and effectiveness of the group’s speech were rejected in McConnell. This Court also rejects their contention that §201’s disclosure requirements must be confined to speech thatis the functional equivalent of express advocacy under WRTL’s test for restrictions on independent expenditures, 551 U. S., at 469–476(opinion of ROBERTS, C.J.). Disclosure is the less-restrictive alterna-tive to more comprehensive speech regulations. Such requirements have been upheld in Buckley and McConnell. Citizens United’s ar-gument that no informational interest justifies applying §201 to itsads is similar to the argument this Court rejected with regard to dis-claimers. Citizens United finally claims that disclosure requirementscan chill donations by exposing donors to retaliation, but offers noevidence that its members face the type of threats, harassment, orreprisals that might make §201 unconstitutional as applied. Pp. 52–
55.
(c) For these same reasons, this Court affirms the application ofthe §§201 and 311 disclaimer and disclosure requirements to Hillary. Pp. 55–56.
Reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded.
KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
C. J., and SCALIA and ALITO, JJ., joined, in which THOMAS, J., joined as to all but Part IV, and in which STEVENS, GINSBURG, BREYER, and SO-TOMAYOR, JJ., joined as to Part IV. ROBERTS, C. J., filed a concurring opinion, in which ALITO, J., joined. SCALIA, J., filed a concurring opin-ion, in which ALITO, J., joined, and in which THOMAS, J., joined in part. STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part,in which GINSBURG, BREYER, and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., joined. THOMAS, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.
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OCTOBER TERM, 2009
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as isbeing done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has beenprepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
CITIZENS UNITED v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
No. 08–205. Argued March 24, 2009—Reargued September 9, 2009––Decided January 21, 2010
As amended by §203 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002(BCRA), federal law prohibits corporations and unions from usingtheir general treasury funds to make independent expenditures for speech that is an “electioneering communication” or for speech thatexpressly advocates the election or defeat of a candidate. 2 U. S. C. §441b. An electioneering communication is “any broadcast, cable, orsatellite communication” that “refers to a clearly identified candidatefor Federal office” and is made within 30 days of a primary election,§434(f)(3)(A), and that is “publicly distributed,” 11 CFR §100.29(a)(2),which in “the case of a candidate for nomination for President . . . means” that the communication “[c]an be received by 50,000 or morepersons in a State where a primary election . . . is being held within 30 days,” §100.29(b)(3)(ii). Corporations and unions may establish apolitical action committee (PAC) for express advocacy or electioneer-ing communications purposes. 2 U. S. C. §441b(b)(2). In McConnell v.Federal Election Comm’n, 540 U. S. 93, 203–209, this Court upheld limits on electioneering communications in a facial challenge, relyingon the holding in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, that political speech may be banned based on the speaker’s corporate identity.
In January 2008, appellant Citizens United, a nonprofit corpora-tion, released a documentary (hereinafter Hillary) critical of then-Senator Hillary Clinton, a candidate for her party’s Presidential nomination. Anticipating that it would make Hillary available on cable television through video-on-demand within 30 days of primaryelections, Citizens United produced television ads to run on broadcast and cable television. Concerned about possible civil and criminal penalties for violating §441b, it sought declaratory and injunctive re-lief, arguing that (1) §441b is unconstitutional as applied to Hillary;and (2) BCRA’s disclaimer, disclosure, and reporting requirements,BCRA §§201 and 311, were unconstitutional as applied to Hillaryand the ads. The District Court denied Citizens United a prelimi-nary injunction and granted appellee Federal Election Commission(FEC) summary judgment.
Held:
1. Because the question whether §441b applies to Hillary cannot be resolved on other, narrower grounds without chilling political speech, this Court must consider the continuing effect of the speech suppres-sion upheld in Austin. Pp. 5–20.
(a)
Citizen United’s narrower arguments—that Hillary is not an “electioneering communication” covered by §441b because it is not“publicly distributed” under 11 CFR §100.29(a)(2); that §441b maynot be applied to Hillary under Federal Election Comm’n v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U. S. 449 (WRTL), which found §441b uncon-stitutional as applied to speech that was not “express advocacy or its functional equivalent,” id., at 481 (opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.), deter-mining that a communication “is the functional equivalent of express advocacy only if [it] is susceptible of no reasonable interpretationother than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate,” id., at 469–470; that §441b should be invalidated as applied to movies shown through video-on-demand because this delivery system has alower risk of distorting the political process than do television ads;and that there should be an exception to §441b’s ban for nonprofitcorporate political speech funded overwhelming by individuals—arenot sustainable under a fair reading of the statute. Pp. 5–12.
(b)
Thus, this case cannot be resolved on a narrower ground without chilling political speech, speech that is central to the First Amendment’s meaning and purpose. Citizens United did not waive this challenge to Austin when it stipulated to dismissing the facial challenge below, since (1) even if such a challenge could be waived, this Court may reconsider Austin and §441b’s facial validity here be-cause the District Court “passed upon” the issue, Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation, 513 U. S. 374, 379; (2) throughoutthe litigation, Citizens United has asserted a claim that the FEC hasviolated its right to free speech; and (3) the parties cannot enter intoa stipulation that prevents the Court from considering remedies nec-essary to resolve a claim that has been preserved. Because Citizen United’s narrower arguments are not sustainable, this Court must, in an exercise of its judicial responsibility, consider §441b’s facial valid-ity. Any other course would prolong the substantial, nationwide chilling effect caused by §441b’s corporate expenditure ban. This conclusion is further supported by the following: (1) the uncertaintycaused by the Government’s litigating position; (2) substantial timewould be required to clarify §441b’s application on the points raisedby the Government’s position in order to avoid any chilling effect caused by an improper interpretation; and (3) because speech itself is of primary importance to the integrity of the election process, anyspeech arguably within the reach of rules created for regulating po-litical speech is chilled. The regulatory scheme at issue may not be aprior restraint in the strict sense. However, given its complexity and the deference courts show to administrative determinations, a speaker wishing to avoid criminal liability threats and the heavycosts of defending against FEC enforcement must ask a governmen-tal agency for prior permission to speak. The restrictions thus func-tion as the equivalent of a prior restraint, giving the FEC poweranalogous to the type of government practices that the First Amend-ment was drawn to prohibit. The ongoing chill on speech makes itnecessary to invoke the earlier precedents that a statute that chills speech can and must be invalidated where its facial invalidity hasbeen demonstrated. Pp. 12–20.
2. Austin is overruled, and thus provides no basis for allowing the Government to limit corporate independent expenditures. Hence, §441b’s restrictions on such expenditures are invalid and cannot be applied to Hillary. Given this conclusion, the part of McConnell that upheld BCRA §203’s extension of §441b’s restrictions on independent corporate expenditures is also overruled. Pp. 20–51.
(a) Although the First Amendment provides that “Congress shallmake no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech,” §441b’s prohibitionon corporate independent expenditures is an outright ban on speech, backed by criminal sanctions. It is a ban notwithstanding the factthat a PAC created by a corporation can still speak, for a PAC is aseparate association from the corporation. Because speech is an es-sential mechanism of democracy—it is the means to hold officials ac-countable to the people—political speech must prevail against lawsthat would suppress it by design or inadvertence. Laws burdening such speech are subject to strict scrutiny, which requires the Gov-ernment to prove that the restriction “furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.” WRTL, 551 U. S., at 464. This language provides a sufficient framework for protecting the interests in this case. Premised on mistrust of governmentalpower, the First Amendment stands against attempts to disfavor cer-tain subjects or viewpoints or to distinguish among different speak-ers, which may be a means to control content. The Government may also commit a constitutional wrong when by law it identifies certain preferred speakers. There is no basis for the proposition that, in thepolitical speech context, the Government may impose restrictions oncertain disfavored speakers. Both history and logic lead to this con-clusion. Pp. 20–25.
(b)
The Court has recognized that the First Amendment appliesto corporations, e.g., First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765, 778, n. 14, and extended this protection to the context of politicalspeech, see, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 428–429. Address-ing challenges to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, the Buckley Court upheld limits on direct contributions to candidates, 18
U.
S. C. §608(b), recognizing a governmental interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption. 424 U. S., at 25–26. However, the Court in-validated §608(e)’s expenditure ban, which applied to individuals,corporations, and unions, because it “fail[ed] to serve any substantialgovernmental interest in stemming the reality or appearance of cor-ruption in the electoral process,” id., at 47–48. While Buckley did not consider a separate ban on corporate and union independent expendi-tures found in §610, had that provision been challenged in Buckley’s wake, it could not have been squared with the precedent’s reasoning and analysis. The Buckley Court did not invoke the overbreadth doc-trine to suggest that §608(e)’s expenditure ban would have been con-stitutional had it applied to corporations and unions but not indi-viduals. Notwithstanding this precedent, Congress soon recodified §610’s corporate and union expenditure ban at 2 U. S. C. §441b, the provision at issue. Less than two years after Buckley, Bellotti reaf-firmed the First Amendment principle that the Government lacks thepower to restrict political speech based on the speaker’s corporate identity. 435 U.S., at 784–785. Thus the law stood until Austin up-held a corporate independent expenditure restriction, bypassing Buckley and Bellotti by recognizing a new governmental interest inpreventing “the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggrega-tions of [corporate] wealth . . . that have little or no correlation to thepublic’s support for the corporation’s political ideas.” 494 U. S., at
660. Pp. 25–32.
(c)
This Court is confronted with conflicting lines of precedent: a pre-Austin line forbidding speech restrictions based on the speaker’s corporate identity and a post-Austin line permitting them. Neither Austin’s antidistortion rationale nor the Government’s other justifica-tions support §441b’s restrictions. Pp. 32–47.
(1)
The First Amendment prohibits Congress from fining or jailing citizens, or associations of citizens, for engaging in politicalspeech, but Austin’s antidistortion rationale would permit the Gov-ernment to ban political speech because the speaker is an associationwith a corporate form. Political speech is “indispensable to decision-making in a democracy, and this is no less true because the speechcomes from a corporation.” Bellotti, supra, at 777 (footnote omitted). This protection is inconsistent with Austin’s rationale, which is meant to prevent corporations from obtaining “ ‘an unfair advantage in the political marketplace’ ” by using “ ‘resources amassed in the economic marketplace.’ ” 494 U. S., at 659. First Amendment protec-tions do not depend on the speaker’s “financial ability to engage in public discussion.” Buckley, supra, at 49. These conclusions were re-affirmed when the Court invalidated a BCRA provision that in-creased the cap on contributions to one candidate if the opponent made certain expenditures from personal funds. Davis v. Federal Election Comm’n, 554 U. S. ___, ___. Distinguishing wealthy indi-viduals from corporations based on the latter’s special advantages of, e.g., limited liability, does not suffice to allow laws prohibiting speech. It is irrelevant for First Amendment purposes that corporate funds may “have little or no correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s political ideas.” Austin, supra, at 660. All speakers, in-cluding individuals and the media, use money amassed from the eco-nomic marketplace to fund their speech, and the First Amendment protects the resulting speech. Under the antidistortion rationale, Congress could also ban political speech of media corporations. Al-though currently exempt from §441b, they accumulate wealth withthe help of their corporate form, may have aggregations of wealth,and may express views “hav[ing] little or no correlation to the public’ssupport” for those views. Differential treatment of media corpora-tions and other corporations cannot be squared with the First Amendment, and there is no support for the view that the Amend-ment’s original meaning would permit suppressing media corpora-tions’ political speech. Austin interferes with the “open marketplace”of ideas protected by the First Amendment. New York State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 552 U. S. 196, 208. Its censorship is vast inits reach, suppressing the speech of both for-profit and nonprofit,both small and large, corporations. Pp. 32–40.
(2) This reasoning also shows the invalidity of the Govern-ment’s other arguments. It reasons that corporate political speechcan be banned to prevent corruption or its appearance. The BuckleyCourt found this rationale “sufficiently important” to allow contribu-tion limits but refused to extend that reasoning to expenditure limits,424 U.S., at 25, and the Court does not do so here. While a single Bellotti footnote purported to leave the question open, 435 U. S., at788, n. 26, this Court now concludes that independent expenditures, including those made by corporations, do not give rise to corruptionor the appearance of corruption. That speakers may have influence over or access to elected officials does not mean that those officials are corrupt. And the appearance of influence or access will not causethe electorate to lose faith in this democracy. Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U. S. ___, distinguished. Pp. 40–45.
(3)
The Government’s asserted interest in protecting share-holders from being compelled to fund corporate speech, like the anti-distortion rationale, would allow the Government to ban politicalspeech even of media corporations. The statute is underinclusive; it only protects a dissenting shareholder’s interests in certain media for 30 or 60 days before an election when such interests would be impli-cated in any media at any time. It is also overinclusive because it covers all corporations, including those with one shareholder. P. 46.
(4)
Because §441b is not limited to corporations or associa-tions created in foreign countries or funded predominantly by foreignshareholders, it would be overbroad even if the Court were to recog-nize a compelling governmental interest in limiting foreign influence over the Nation’s political process. Pp. 46–47.
(d)
The relevant factors in deciding whether to adhere to stare decisis, beyond workability—the precedent’s antiquity, the reliance interests at stake, and whether the decision was well reasoned— counsel in favor of abandoning Austin, which itself contravened the precedents of Buckley and Bellotti. As already explained, Austin was not well reasoned. It is also undermined by experience since its an-nouncement. Political speech is so ingrained in this country’s culture that speakers find ways around campaign finance laws. Rapid changes in technology—and the creative dynamic inherent in the concept of free expression—counsel against upholding a law that re-stricts political speech in certain media or by certain speakers. In addition, no serious reliance issues are at stake. Thus, due consid-eration leads to the conclusion that Austin should be overruled. The Court returns to the principle established in Buckley and Bellotti that the Government may not suppress political speech based on the speaker’s corporate identity. No sufficient governmental interest jus-tifies limits on the political speech of nonprofit or for-profit corpora-tions. Pp. 47–50.
3. BCRA §§201 and 311 are valid as applied to the ads for Hillaryand to the movie itself. Pp. 50–57.
(a) Disclaimer and disclosure requirements may burden the abil-ity to speak, but they “impose no ceiling on campaign-related activi-ties,” Buckley, 424 U. S., at 64, or “ ‘ “prevent anyone from speak-ing,” ’ ” McConnell, supra, at 201. The Buckley Court explained that disclosure can be justified by a governmental interest in providing “the electorate with information” about election-related spending sources. The McConnell Court applied this interest in rejecting facialchallenges to §§201 and 311. 540 U. S., at 196. However, the Court acknowledged that as-applied challenges would be available if agroup could show a “ ‘reasonable probability’ ” that disclosing its con-tributors’ names would “ ‘subject them to threats, harassment, or re-prisals from either Government officials or private parties.’ ” Id., at
198. Pp. 50–52.
(b) The disclaimer and disclosure requirements are valid as ap-plied to Citizens United’s ads. They fall within BCRA’s “electioneer-ing communication” definition: They referred to then-Senator Clintonby name shortly before a primary and contained pejorative references to her candidacy. Section 311 disclaimers provide information to the electorate, McConnell, supra, at 196, and “insure that the voters are fully informed” about who is speaking, Buckley, supra, at 76. At the very least, they avoid confusion by making clear that the ads are not funded by a candidate or political party. Citizens United’s arguments that §311 is underinclusive because it requires disclaimers for broad-cast advertisements but not for print or Internet advertising and that §311 decreases the quantity and effectiveness of the group’s speech were rejected in McConnell. This Court also rejects their contention that §201’s disclosure requirements must be confined to speech thatis the functional equivalent of express advocacy under WRTL’s test for restrictions on independent expenditures, 551 U. S., at 469–476(opinion of ROBERTS, C.J.). Disclosure is the less-restrictive alterna-tive to more comprehensive speech regulations. Such requirements have been upheld in Buckley and McConnell. Citizens United’s ar-gument that no informational interest justifies applying §201 to itsads is similar to the argument this Court rejected with regard to dis-claimers. Citizens United finally claims that disclosure requirementscan chill donations by exposing donors to retaliation, but offers noevidence that its members face the type of threats, harassment, orreprisals that might make §201 unconstitutional as applied. Pp. 52–
55.
(c) For these same reasons, this Court affirms the application ofthe §§201 and 311 disclaimer and disclosure requirements to Hillary. Pp. 55–56.
Reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded.
KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
C. J., and SCALIA and ALITO, JJ., joined, in which THOMAS, J., joined as to all but Part IV, and in which STEVENS, GINSBURG, BREYER, and SO-TOMAYOR, JJ., joined as to Part IV. ROBERTS, C. J., filed a concurring opinion, in which ALITO, J., joined. SCALIA, J., filed a concurring opin-ion, in which ALITO, J., joined, and in which THOMAS, J., joined in part. STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part,in which GINSBURG, BREYER, and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., joined. THOMAS, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Saturday, February 20, 2010
各位法官：
各位法官：
针对江北区检察院指控我犯有“伪造证据、妨害作证罪”，自辩如下：
一、委托代理经过
2009年6月下旬，龚刚模的三哥龚刚华通过朋友到北京找我，咨询龚案。龚刚华只是简单叙述了自己的弟弟涉嫌一支手枪和放高利贷的事，没有其他任何罪行，同案只有三人，与黑社会无关。同时声称弟妹也在京，明天过来详谈。
期间经过6至11月的近半年时间，杳无音讯。我也将此事淡忘。11月20号左右的一天，我突然接到重庆龚刚华来电，催促我尽快赴渝，称龚案马上就要开庭，并说龚妻也在京，由她与我们所签订委托协议。
与龚妻会晤后，她也只是向我介绍了龚只有涉嫌一把枪和放高利贷的事情，同案共抓了三个人，公安报检察院要挂到其他黑社会组织中，但两次报检察院都没有批。龚没有其他罪行，只是因购买资产包得罪了人，初步达成委托意向后，我即赴渝。
自从在渝一中院领取起诉书和部分卷宗资料以及会见龚刚模本人以后，我感觉案情重大，认为龚刚模三哥和妻子程琪他们欺骗了我。事后我郑重向他们提出了抗议。鉴于委托手续已递交法院、开庭在即，龚妻身患绝症，哥哥向我下跪等因素，出于职业责任感和怜悯之心，我正式接受了刑事辩护、刑事附带民事、法律顾问、反诉以及其他民事诉讼的委托。总计收费150万元。以上是接受委托全部过程。
二、本罪的客观要件必须是“将已经伪造的证据提交司法机关，或者对积极要求向司法机关作证的人实施威胁、恐吓、阻扰、干扰等妨害行为，因而使司法机关对案件的性质、情节等做出错误的判断，情节严重的行为。”（见陈光中教授《刑法总论》）。
结合本案。
第一，关于伪造证据罪：就我代理龚刚模案以来，迄今为止，从未向重庆任何司法机关提交过任何形式的证据，因所有证据都在调查、收集、核实之中，均未形成最后的证据物质形态。根据排除法则，“伪造证据”之说显然不能成立。（证人、证言也未最终形成）
第二，关于妨害作证罪：既然我被控为“妨害”主体，理所当然应当有被“妨害”的相对人，即被“妨害人”。
首先，龚案共计有检方提交的180名证人名单。暂且不说这180人中有姓名重复的，有只见证言不见姓名的，仅就这180人而言，我始终与他们没有任何形式的直接或间接接触。因而，无从谈起“妨害”。相反，我还正式向法庭提交了要求这180人出庭的申请，欢迎他们出庭。
其次，作为辩方，我曾向法庭依法提交了辩方请求的龚刚华、龚云飞、林丽、程琪等证人出庭的申请。但至今未见法院依法予以书面或口头答复，是否准许这四人出庭存在两种结果。这四人是否愿意出庭也包含两种可能。在这四人的接触中，他们均表示不愿意、不敢。总之，事实上庭审没有进行，四人既未出具书证，亦未当庭作证，更无从谈起改变以前证言。
《刑法》第306条第一款规定：在刑诉中，辩护人或帮助当事人毁灭、伪造证据，威胁、引诱证人违背事实、改变证言或者作伪证的。第二款规定，辩护人提供、出示、引用的证人证言或者其他证据失实，不是有意伪造的，不属伪造证据。结合第二款可以看出第一款指明的是结果犯，即犯罪行为引发了行为后果。
结合上述法律规定，对照本案，第一，被告人没有毁灭也从未帮助当事人毁灭已有的证据；第二，被告人没有伪造形成任何证据的物质形态；第三，龚刚模是该案的被告人，不是证人；第四，被告人与控方提供的180名证人没有任何形式的直接或间接接触；第五，辩方准备提供的四名证人至今拒绝出庭，尚不具有法律上的意义上的证人身份；第六，被告人既未威胁、诱导控方提供的180名证人改变证言，也未诱导辩方准备提供的四名准证人改变证言，因他们以前根本没有证言；第七，庭审至今未举行，也无从谈起辩护人提供、出示、引用证据，因为所有的证据、证人证言均未最后形成。
三、起诉指控的基本事实不清，相关证据不足。
第一，关于诉控我在会见龚刚模时诱导、唆使龚编造公安机关对其刑讯逼供，实属颠倒黑白，违背基本逻辑。
事情的原委是：09年11月24日下午，法院将部分卷宗复印件交我以后，（不让看卷，没有证据目录）即刻赶往江北看守所。途中车上，我快速翻阅了起诉书和龚的口供，其中最引人注目的是龚长期为黑社会组织提供大量资金支持，无偿送夜总会40%的股份给樊奇杭，承认在黑组织中是老大地位。
带看上述最为关注的焦点，16时许，到了江北看守所，要求会见遭到拒绝：必须得有办案单位陪同，否则不让会见。我据理力争，解释说律师会见不被监视监听，并立即出具了《开庭通知书》、《起诉书》等相关会见手续，仍然遭拒。名曰：为了保护律师的安全。无奈，只有长时间等待江北分局干警到来。
临近下班时，江北分局干警到来，监视我一同会见，经反复交涉，抗议未果，期间发生语言冲突。
会见开始，当问到龚：你自己在口供中承认了黑老大地位时，龚痛苦地说：这些口供都是他们编好以后逼我签字的，不签字他们就打我呀！经详细询问，龚娓娓道来：“他们抓我以后只是在江北看守所办理了入所手续，但一天未住，当天就把我弄到了铁山坪民兵训练基地，悬空吊了我八天”。我惊诧地问道：八天，那不物理性撕裂了啊！龚回答：到晚间他们让我脚踩一个电脑桌放松一下。白天有时单手吊、有时双手吊。我又问有伤吗？龚伸出左手让我看他手腕和手背上深深的吊痕，接着说道：打我的人叫张科和彭伟。我大小便失禁，叫彭伟的警察放我下来，令我手捧大便到卫生间，脱下内裤清洗再用内裤回到审讯室擦地板，擦完后，裸体继续吊我。那天，正好江北分局刑侦支队的何副支队长从门口路过，看到这一幕，还训斥了彭伟。“哎，太不像话了，赶快穿上衣服。”彭伟放我下来，穿上刚刚擦过地板的内裤，继续吊我。有两名医生先后为我疗伤，一男一女。我还问龚，你是哪天回到江北看守所的。他说前两天刚刚回来。我指出：起诉书20号刚刚打印，难道你整个侦查、起诉两个阶段都在铁山坪民兵基地吗？龚不置可否。我又问：你以前向律师反映过吗？龚回答：以前从未见过律师。听了以后，我郑重告诫龚：你一定要实事求是，千万不要欺骗律师。那样会害了你自己。（详见现场录像、录音）。龚再三保证：绝无虚假。特别值得说明的是，龚的口供中多次提到遭李明航、徐向阳等人的敲诈，并正式委托我代理反诉51万。整个会见过程干警始终在场，并未制止会见。
会见时，我还告诉龚：你私藏枪支、行贿等都是事实，肯定是有罪的。另外，开庭时我会申请法庭为你验伤，申请延期审理。龚担心的说：他们不同意怎么办？我回答：如果那样，我就退庭。这时，站在一旁负责监视的干警插话：哼，你走了，法院可以指定啊。你以为你走了庭就不开了吗？我又向这名干警解释：法院指定的前提是被告人没有委托律师，为了迫使我们大声说话，以便录音、监听，干警还将龚坐的凳子拖到了两米开外。
上述过程明显可以看出，律师抓住要害的提问，是龚检举刑讯逼供的导火索。它完全是龚本人的真实心理流露。任何一名律师也决不会无中生有的去“诱导”、“唆使”被告人去编造子虚乌有的被刑讯事实。同时我更坚信一个普通的被告人不会在承办干警的怒视之中，在亲自刑讯自己的干警的严密监视之下，语言流畅的叙述被刑讯经过。期间，我还指着身旁的一位监视会见的干警问龚：他打你了吗？龚颤颤惊惊回答：“他……没有打我。但他也在打我的现场……。”如此触目惊心的被刑讯细节，是律师能够编造的吗？！
面对如此形成的笔录，令人沉思，如何突破，是摆在我面前很大的难题。这一难题的出现，促使了我在后面有求于重庆的吴家友律师。
诉控指出，为了使龚编造的刑讯逼供得到法院采信，我又于09年11月底至12月初“编造”了龚刚模被樊奇杭敲诈的事实，并要求程琪出庭作证。
首先，诉控的具体时间、地点不明。根据《刑诉法》、《公安机关办理刑案规则》、《检察院办理刑案规则》等，都要求查明具体的犯罪时间和地点，如果本人真是犯罪，那么起诉事实不清。
其次，根据事先确定的谈话重点，我在会见时曾问龚：樊奇杭买车找你借款，你爱人是否知道？龚明确回答：我爱人一向反对我和这些人来往，叫我远离他们，更反对我借款给他们。我对爱人讲，咱们做生意的，惹不起这些人，最后还是借款给樊。
了解上述情况后，我找程琪进行了核实。她真真切切地告诉我这些都是真的。我肯请她出庭作证，遭她婉拒，自己乳癌切除，已是晚期，扩散到了肝，担心自己无法坚持到最后见老公一面。截至目前，始终也未能得到程琪能够出庭作证的肯定答复。我期待着与程琪当庭对质。
再次，我请求程琪出庭是为了核实龚刚模多次被他人敲诈的事实。这与指控我“编造”刑讯逼供的事实是否得到法院采信没有任何关系。
第三，诉控指出，我在09年11月24日在重庆一茶楼内“指使龚刚华安排保利员工作伪证，否认龚刚模是保利公司实际控制者和出资人。”
首先，我11月24日从未在什么茶楼见过龚刚华，如何指使他安排何人作伪证更是无从谈起，不知控方证据何在。
其次，本人确实在一上岛咖啡厅见过龚刚华。期间，丝毫没有谈过找什么员工作证一事，只是要求他协助查找高利贷借据，并复印所有与龚刚模有关的公司工商档案。经查，工商档案清楚无误的标明，保利公司（不是指控的夜总会）90%的股份是属唐筱，上面根本也未体现龚刚模是实际投资人和控制者，至于他是否是实际控制者，应当由将来的法庭度量，与辩护策略和方向无关。
特别值得指出的是：龚刚华安排的三位员工与我从未谋面，毫不相识。龚为何安排他们？何时？何地？授意内容等等，本人一无所知。我与这三名证人之间的证据链因为龚刚华这一环的缺失而断裂，如此重要的证人，我也特别期待与他在法庭上相见。
第四，诉控指出：09年12月3日，我在五州大酒店内，指使龚刚模的另一辩护人吴家友贿买警察，为龚被刑讯逼供作伪证，此说完全是无中生有。
首先，龚已经办理了两名辩护律师手续，吴不可能成为第三名辩护人。
其次，自从龚在会见时详细描述了被刑讯以后，我的主要调查方向就是收集相关证据。这也是一名优秀律师应具有的基本素养。虽然这是刑辩过程中最大的风险。但为了查明案件事实真相，更为了履行律师职责，对得起自己的职业良心，本人甘冒任何风险。
据了解得知：吴在北京公安大学毕业后，一直在重庆警方供职，2005年辞职从事律师工作，自称与龚刚模专案的人很熟，为此我委托吴搜集相关证据，委托费用当时也根本未读。
09年12月6日晚，（不是指控的12月3日）吴到酒店找我，当着马晓军、龚云飞面对我们大家说：经了解，龚刚模确实在铁山坪基地被打过，给他看伤的两名医生我都认识，一个姓王。我当时请求安排会见，吴也答应试试看。晚些时候我送吴到楼下门口，语重心长地对吴讲：事关重大，尽力想办法找到那两位医生。吴解释：这些医生也是警察，我们原来是同行，人家不愿意和你见面，更不可能出庭为你作证。人家还要在重庆混啊！我对吴半开玩笑说：如果没办法，你就出庭帮我作证吧，把你打听到的消息如实在法庭上讲出来，这也是证据的一种形式嘛。吴大惊失色，予以拒绝。自始自终我们也未谈过如何贿买警察作证的事。如何贿买？贿买对象、价格、方式等。真不知有无这方面的证据，也无法想象这些证据是如何出笼的。
因为法律规定：凡是知道案件事实真相的人，都有作证的义务，凡是能够证明案件的一切事实，都是证据。所以是否贿买不是主要的，关键是刑讯逼供是否属实？为龚疗伤是否属实？疗伤的那两名医生是否存在？是否在铁山坪关押过龚？这些都有待相关机构作出最终结论。这些也是有关机关应当关注的核心。为何核心无人关注？为何要急于逮捕律师呢？
第五，诉控指出：本人的犯罪行为干扰了审理工作的正常进行。
我认为，正是本人认真履行了一个优秀律师应当履行的职责，而阻止了一起“人命关天”的重大冤假错案的发生，起码是暂时阻止了。（因为本人已被限制自由）
本人的所有行为，纵使是犯罪行为，与龚案是否如期开庭没有必然关系，无论是否伪造了证据，是否妨害了他人作证，（包括不愿意作证的），均不影响法庭的如期开庭。假如我当庭提交了不真实的证据，充其量不予采信，更何况我准备收集的证据没有形成，准备动员出庭的证人尚未答应出庭，即法律上要求本罪的客观形式要件完全没有形成。
延期审理的真实情况如下：
2009年11月31日，由于重庆明传电报到北京反映了我的情况，律协以及事务所领导找我谈话，了解我所代理的重庆“涉黑”案情况。我据实进行了汇报。诸如：龚的黑老大地位不明显，其他犯罪事实中龚的作用不大，遭到刑讯逼供，身上有伤，很多口供雷同，甚至错别字都一样，准备召集专家论证等。领导指示：尽快赴渝，一定在开庭前与有关部门沟通。12月1日上午，重庆一中院陈远平庭长也主动来电：希望尽快来渝庭前沟通。12月2日14时19时，我邀请了在京的部分我国刑法界著名专家、学者陈光中、陈兴良等，就龚刚模在该涉黑案中的法律地位以及在李明航被害案中的作用进行论证。经过认真仔细的审阅卷宗（我从法院复印的所有资料），广泛的讨论，最后，我国刑法学泰斗、世界级法学家陈光中教授与其他四位专家一道，郑重地作出了专家论证结论：1、龚刚模在涉黑组织中不具备黑老大地位；2、在李明航被害案中不负主要刑事责任。带着专家的论证意见，我连夜赴渝。
遵照北京各级组织和领导的指示，以及重庆一中院陈远平庭长的要求，我于12月3日一早来到了重庆一中院，与李副院长、陈远平庭长、其他领导以及合议庭其他成员会晤。
我首先表达了对重庆“打黑”举双手赞成，然后我逐一汇报了我对该案中存在问题的看法和想法。例如：侦察、起诉两个阶段不让会见，审判阶段被监视会见，刑讯逼供，被告人有伤，口供雷同，甚至标点符号、错别字、方言、病句都一模一样等一系列问题，并与其他领导一起寻求解决方案，同时声明如果就目前状况如期开庭，社会效果不会很好，甚至给重庆打黑带来负面影响。领导们认真听了我诚恳的汇报，同时，我也毫不保留地将我的辩护思路、辩护策略以及辩护方向等告知了各位领导。他们也各自仔细作了记录，并告知我会慎重考虑我的意见及时向上级汇报。12月7日是否还能如期开庭，叫我等候通知。当晚23时许，我再次致电陈远平庭长询问开庭日期。陈答复：领导们正在开会，尚没有消息，需继续等待。
12月4日上午，经无数次联系陈庭长，电话未通，为充分履行辩护职责，以备12月7日如期开庭，我不得不再次来到江北看守所会见龚。因仍被要求警方监视会见，我当即致电陈庭长（我换了一个重庆号码）提出质疑，陈说马上向领导汇报，协调此事。数分钟后，陈回电：你可以不受任何监视，不受任何干扰的会见了。但仍遭警方阻挠，我与监视我会见的警察发生了最激烈的争吵，并当场揭露了个别警员刑讯的违纪行为。（详见录像）
12月5日18时许，接到一中院书记员张红电告：12月7日庭审取消，开庭日期另行通知。在途经成都、河北办理其他案件时，接领导电话：因重庆案立即回京报到。11日下午我向所党委报到，如实汇报了此次重庆的会见及沟通情况等，按照上级机关指示，经我所管委会、党委研究决定，并报上级机关批准，我撤出重庆龚案，取消代理，尽快与当事人办理相关解除手续。此间，突然接到陈远平庭长来电，声称：龚刚模在看守所情绪不稳，求见律师。我说：我14日下午 2点，15日上午9点都要在最高人民法院开庭，分别代理天津光达公司、河北柠檬公司两个案子，休庭后即刻赴渝。通话结束后，我当即向领导报告：重庆警方在诱捕我。如果我真是犯了罪，今天就算投案吧。几天中，我还接到近二十家海内外媒体记者电话预约、采访，我均予以了回避。
12月12日上午，我以电话、短信的方式正式通知陈庭长，取消龚案代理，解除手续15日休庭后赴渝提交。当日下午在与龚刚模妻子商谈办理解除代理手续事宜时被抓。
以上是被捕前的详细经过，这些也是龚案不能在12月7日如期开庭的真正原因。这与我被控的什么“干扰行为”没有法律上的任何因果关系。因为我的所有“行为、结果”均未出现在法庭审理之中，而是之前。
特别值得提请法庭注意的是，我的所谓“伪造证据、妨害作证”并没有干扰审理。取消12月7日开庭的原因也根本不在于此。它是重庆当局经再三考虑的明智之举，历史可以检验今天所发生的一切，我坚信！
四、关于我的案件在程序上存在的一些问题
1.侦察、起诉两个阶段虽然告知本人有权聘请律师，本人也在笔录中强烈要求，但这两个阶段都遭拒绝。异地抓捕需经北京市公安机关，但江北分局在京对本人实施秘密抓捕。
2.自12月12日下午至14日上午，对我数十小时不间断轮班审讯，属于以“饥”、“渴”、“不让睡眠”的变相刑讯。
3.审讯□□读其他证人口供，逼我按照相同的说法供述，遭我拒绝，审讯人员威胁：是不是换一种审问你的方式（刑讯）或者直接注明你拒不签字。由此可见，龚刚模案中那些法律知识不如我的人的口供是如何形成的。据为樊奇杭辩护的朱明勇律师介绍，樊也被吊打10天之多。
五、对我案件的思索
律师制度的产生，是人类文明发展到一定阶段的产物，它也是现代社会民主与法制的标志。相比较西方国家几百年的律师发展史，我国的律师事业算是刚刚起步。《律师法》作为我国第一部律师方面的法律，于去年刚刚颁布实施。有关律师的执业权利、义务、职责等，二十多年来也都是在摸索和探索中。《律师法》中规定的“律师执业过程中的人身权利不受侵害，律师在法庭上的发言不受追究。律师会见不被监视、监听等条款的出现，无不显示出党和国家对稚嫩的律师事业的关爱和期待。
当然，作为一名法律工作者，在刑事诉讼中，应与公、检、法紧密配合，由于法定职责不同，其工作侧重点也肯定各异。但宗旨应当是在尊重事实的前提下，提出对被告人无罪或罪轻的证据和辩护。
可是，刑事辩护风险大，涉黑辩护风险更大，异地为黑老大辩护无异于刀尖上跳舞。这些都是律师界公认的规则，它也是我国刑辩律师日趋减少的首要原因，也难怪西方媒体评论：我国不会出现世界一流的刑辩律师。这不能不说是我国律师制度的悲哀。
刑辩律师本来就充当着“横挑鼻子、竖挑眼”的角色，这一角色也是为了把周永康同志、薄熙来书记多次强调的“要把每一个案子办成铁案”的要求落到实处。
即使个别刑辩律师看问题的角度有失公允，语言偏激一些，但其目的也是为了使每一个案子“经得住历史检验”。
由于现行法律对律师伪证的判例极少，相关司法解释几乎空白，司法尺度很难掌握，在这种情况下，如果我们不从大局出发，不考虑社会影响，动辄抓律师、堵律师的嘴，这种做法所带来的负面影响，不仅仅是对律师个人的伤害，也不仅仅是对国家司法资源的浪费，更严重的是对律师事业的打击以及对法制建设的阻碍与践踏。
近二十年来，我也曾为十余名被害人代理刑事附带民事，协助公诉机关指控犯罪。其中不乏有多起被告人被处以极刑。当然，我也为众多被告人做了无罪或罪轻的辩护，绝大部分依法得到了从轻、减轻处理，有的甚至无罪释放。但这些出色的工作被侦办我的专案组声讨为“作孽”，执法人员的“职业歧视”心理如此严重，法律意识如此淡泊也是酿成我这个案件的重要原因。
从业近20年，本人自认为在中国律师界是较为正直、善良、敬业和勇敢的，无论是拯救四川大熊猫，修复长城、抗洪救灾的捐款，还是“5.12”汶川地震捐出50万元资助贫困儿童，亦或是为社会提供上百起义务法律服务，本人无不是走在时代的前列，即使在代理龚案的辩护工作中，有这样那样的缺点和错误，我希望法庭本着“罪刑法定”、“疑罪从无”的原则审慎处理。
综上，诉控我“伪造证据”的客观物质没有，“妨害作证”的对象不存在，本人被控的一系列行为全部发生在庭审之前，在法律规定的“情节严重”不明、司法解释空白的情况下，不能不说起诉事实完全不清，相关证据根本不明，适用法律明显错误，本着从大局出发，从维护律师队伍稳定的角度出发，望合议庭以客观事实为依据，以基本形式逻辑为参考，以现行有效的法律为准绳，依法驳回江北区人民检察院的起诉，尽快宣告本人无罪。
最后，我愿以个人暂时的人身自由为代价，促使重庆“打黑”工作进一步规范，推动我国的民主与法制进程向前迈进一步，哪怕是极其微小的一步，足矣！
被告人：李庄
2009年12月19日
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